Some reflections on financial fragility in banking and finance by Chick, V
J W  JOURNAL  OF ECONOMIC  ISSUES 
Vol. XXXI  No. 2  June 1997 
Some  Reflections  on Financial  Fragility  in Banking  and Finance 
Victoria  Chick 
The most valuable lesson I learned as a student  of Hy Minsky's at Berkeley I 
learned after the seminars. Hy always had a good attendance  at his Money and 
Banking seminars from the Bank of California  and the San Francisco Fed, and we 
would all go to a local bierstube, where the beer came in vast pitchers and seemed 
in infinite supply. There I would watch fascinated  as Hy, who always dominated 
and steered the conversation,  would turn first to a student, then to a banker, asking 
questions geared quite precisely to what each could reasonably  be expected to know: 
theoretical  questions to unworldly  students  and matters  of practice and policy to the 
bankers. There seemed to be two entirely separate  worlds of discourse-only Hy 
seemed able to live in both at once. It was all grist to his mill: in the next seminar, 
the answers to practical  questions  became part of the theoretical  discourse, and the- 
ory would be turned  to the analysis of some aspect of bank behavior  we had heard 
about over beer. Despite all the pressures  of the mainstream  search for "pure"  the- 
ory,  Hy never departed from this method: the historical and institutional  contin- 
gency of economic theory is a hallmark  of Hy's work. 
Like so much that I should have learned at the time, this lesson took time to 
come to some sort of fruition: I am by temperament  a theorist, much less engaged 
with the world than Hy, who was always deeply engaged. Eventually, the historical 
and institutional  foundations  of Keynes's General Theory  began to intrigue me-and 
then a breakthrough  came, when two big issues in economic theory came together:  I 
realized that the reversal of causality  between saving and investment  was dependent 
on the banking system's having reached  the stage at which it could create loans "by 
the stroke of the pen," independently  of saving, because the resulting deposits had 
become means of payment  and would be willingly held [Chick 1983]. It was this fa- 
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cility that allowed the "long side of  the market"  (for saving and investment) to 
dominate  when investment  exceeded saving, and it was this new money that consti- 
tuted the "injection  into the circular flow of income" that we all told our first-year 
students  about in those days. 
Although banks  had reached  this stage [identified  as "Stage  2" in Chick 1986] in 
England from round about the last quarter  of the nineteenth  century, and it can be 
argued that in Scotland  the banks began in this phase because of a shortage  of cash 
[Dow and Earl 1982, chap. 3; Chick and Dow  1997], the debate on the banks' 
power to create credit beyond the limits of intermediation  was only settled in the 
1920s [Crick 1927]. (Theory follows history with a long and variable  lag.) Integra- 
tion with the theory of autonomous  expenditure  waited for Keynes [1936], who did 
not make the link explicit. The role of bank  credit in supporting  investment  has been 
part of  the endogenous money story for a long time [see,  e.g.,  Davidson 1972; 
1979, chap. 11], but the story takes the ability of the banks to create credit inde- 
pendently of saving for granted rather  than emphasizing  the historical perspective: 
that  perspective suggests that there  was a time when the classical priority  was true. 
Having shown the importance  of banking  development  to one of the most impor- 
tant conclusions of The General Theory, it is perhaps time to revisit the subject in 
the light of recent stages of the evolution of banking  practice  and to enquire  whether 
these changes, in  combination with modem techniques of  company finance and 
changes in the securities markets, alter the conclusions of The General Theory  re- 
garding the role of investment. The changes in banking  practice I have in mind are 
off-balance-sheet  activities and, particularly,  securitized lending [Stage 6 in Chick 
1993]. These combine with the considerable  reliance by firms of internal finance 
(which has been important  at least since the end of World War II) and a recent shift 
toward the markets, rather than the banks, as sources of external finance. Finally, 
the major actors in securities markets  are now pension funds and insurance  compa- 
nies: saving has become institutionalized  and their management  professionalized. 
The Finance and Funding of Investment 
In what I will refer to as the "Stage  2+"  theory, because banks have reached 
their second stage of development  or better, at least some of an expanded  level of 
investment  was first financed  by bank  lending, then later funded  by firms issuing se- 
curities and paying the banks  back. Finance takes place without  prior saving; saving 
provides the funding. Funding fully restores the banks' liquidity. (Cllick [1984], 
Davidson  [1986],  and Studart [1995]  all  argue that this picture derives  from 
Keynes's post-General  Theory  writings in 1937-39, with the additional  aspect of the 
evolutionary  perspective  on banking  stressed  by Chick and Studart.) 
One conclusion of this analysis is that the pace of growth is important  for the fi- 
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ment, the resulting increase in the money supply will cause trouble if it is not con- 
tinually resorbed by funding. While Keynesian saving is  always "adequate,"  one 
must not forget that this aggregate  includes  holdings of new money generated  in the 
financing  of investment,  and if these are in excess of desired  holdings, inflation  may 
result1 and the funding mechanism  will be disturbed. The banks will become in- 
creasingly illiquid. This outcome is the likelier the faster the rate of growth of in- 
vestment. So the robustness or fragility of the system is not only structural,  but 
depends  also on the pace of change [Chick 1984]. 
Toporowski [1994] has challenged  this account of finance and funding. Quoting 
the famous passage,  "When  the capital development  of a country becomes a by- 
product of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done" [Keynes 1936,  159], Topo- 
rowski comments, "Keynes  was wrong on a matter  of empirical fact: It is precisely 
because of these dangers that established  companies try not to finance their fixed 
capital investment from the capital markets [but rather from] their reserves (i.e., 
their accumulated  undistributed  income) and in Britain some 80% of such invest- 
ment is financed in this way" [1994, 70]. Internal  financing  by firms has long been 
emphasized  by Post Keynesians,  including  Minsky [1975, chap. 5], who argued  that 
firms will typically choose this method  first because it is cheaper  and the cost is less 
uncertain.  And there is no doubt  that  today it is the dominant  method.2  If it were the 
only method, however, the autonomy  of investment  would be in serious question. 
Part of the problem is that the description  is incomplete. Reserves are a book- 
keeping entry. The matching  entry is a collection of financial  assets, mostly liquid. 
These will have to be sold to finance expenditure.  From the point of view of the 
autonomy  of investment, the effect is indistinguishable  from financing  by means of 
issue of new debt: the question is only who buys the debt or asset instruments.  If 
they are purchased  by banks in exchange for new deposits, the endogenous-money 
element of the story told above goes through.  Firms will still have to arrange  fund- 
ing once the capital  is on the balance  sheet, but the liquidity  of the purchasing  banks 
does not rely on the success of this operation:  the banks can restore their own li- 
quidity  when they wish by selling the asset. 
If the assets are sold to the market, the story is the old loanable funds tale of 
new money being constrained  by the flow of  saving, unless there is some twist 
bringing  in bank credit. One such twist arose in Britain  in the 1980s, when the Bank 
of England  acquired  a significant  amount  of commercial  paper, thus financing  firms' 
expenditure  with high-powered  money. Another  pertains  to the U.S.  market, where 
recent trends show that firms are going direct to market with commercial paper 
(which would later need funding) rather  than to banks. However, the Federal Re- 
serve, in response to the Penn Central  default, now promises to support  banks that 
back up commercial  paper; commercial  paper is thus routinely issued with a back- 
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tential, and unless and until lines of credit are activated, the transaction  remains  off 
the banks' balance sheets. 
Both these examples concern short-term  paper, usually associated with the fi- 
nance of working capital rather  than investment,  but if the firm is building the new 
capital in-house, the two are indistinguishable.  This point was just as pertinent  to 
Keynes's explanation, for he would not have supposed  that  banks  would lend for in- 
vestment on a long-term basis either. This brings us to the role of  the securities 
markets. Their funding  role, as we have seen, needs to be supplemented  by the pro- 
vision of a market  for assets when reserves need to be realized. The influence  of the 
new actors (new, that is, in their importance  since Keynes wrote) is one that  Keynes 
anticipated: 
It might have been supposed that competition  between expert professionals, 
possessing  judgment and knowledge beyond that  of the average  private  inves- 
tor, would correct the vagaries of the ignorant  individual  left to himself. It 
happens, however, that the energies and skill of the professional  investor and 
speculator  are mainly occupied . ..  not with making  superior  long-term  fore- 
casts of the probable  yield of an investment  over its whole life, but with fore- 
seeing changes in the conventional  basis of valuation a short time ahead of 
the general public [Keynes 1936, 154]. 
The new actors in the casino are more active, the speculation  more intense. With 
both the banks and firms turning to more securitized lending, the markets  have a 
greater role in financing deficit expenditure  as well as funding  the capital stock, the 
influence of speculative  behavior  is increased. 
Financial Fragility in the Evolution of Banking 
An interesting  question, perhaps, is why banks and firms are turning  to securi- 
tized forms of finance. In my pieces on the evolution of banks [1986, 1993], it was 
the progressively enhanced  freedom of banks to lend that took center stage, but the 
story is also a classic tale of the evolution of financial  fragility. Drawing this point 
out, we see securitization  and off-balance-sheet  activity in clear perspective as re- 
treats from the trend  toward  greater  financial  fragility. 
Early in the story, when banks  were isolated and (in England)  drew their capital 
from no more than six partners  with unlimited  liability, both liquidity  and solvency 
were primary concerns of the partners;  they were sustained  by prudent  operations 
alone: wise loans and a good liquidity  cushion  were essential to long-term  survival. 
Gradually, banks formed links with London  banks for both liquidity  and opera- 
tional reasons; these links allowed them access to the money markets  in a liquidity 
crisis. (The U.S. equivalent  is the correspondent  link with Reserve City banks.) The 
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(U.S.:  Federal Funds market). Now liquidity relied not only on each bank's opera- 
tions but on system liquidity, the activities of the discount  houses, and the behavior 
of the money market. By this time, the banks had been integrated  by their willing- 
ness to accept each others' liabilities and conformed  to the "banking  system" of the 
textbook model, in which banks can expand their lending freely as long as others 
are acting in the same way, and since banks' liabilities are now acceptable  as means 
of payment, the cash drain  from lending  was, for the system as a whole, also greatly 
reduced. The degree of  prudence earlier required to maintain liquidity was  thus 
greatly reduced, though  banks  had to learn the new limits by experience. 
Some banks pushed their luck too hard, and macroeconomic  instability  also took 
its toll; the banks' new systemic character, while expanding loan potential, also 
showed its capacity  for contagious  liquidity  crises. These gave rise, after many bank 
failures, to the acceptance  by the central bank of lender-of-last-resort  responsibili- 
ties. This marks  a shift of the source of liquidity  from private  resources-each  bank's 
own operations, leading banks' enlightened  self-interest, and the liquidity potential 
of the money market-to a central institution,  and the rationale  for providing liquid- 
ity  shifts to maintaining  systemic stability, rather than the survival of  individual 
banks. 
The next element of the story is a familiar  theme in American  literature  over the 
last decade or two: the moral hazard  inherent  in measures  adopted  to prevent  conta- 
gion. As the banks felt safer from liquidity  crises caused by their own actions or by 
others in the industry, they realized that the penalty for over-lending  had been re- 
duced again; once again, the limits to lending were expanded  in a way that  could be 
tested by experience. 
The asset side of banks' balance sheets reflect this new confidence after World 
War II. They began with the war inheritance  of a high proportion  of liquid govern- 
ment assets in their portfolios and gradually  ran them down in favor of higher-yield- 
ing loans. Reserves also have been steadily reduced-this  is true of every EU country 
except Spain and Portugal, but Britain represents  the extreme; in Britain reserves 
are now regarded  as having no prudential  role at all and are pared to an operational 
minimum, almost certainly  inadequate  to deal with any major  shock. 
The final stage of increasing financial fragility was the development  of liability 
management,  in which banks made loans in the clear expectation  of having to com- 
pete for deposits to balance their books and restore such minimal liquidity as was 
felt necessary. By this means the source of liquidity  shifts back into the hands  of the 
banks to some extent. 
The development  of securitized  lending  works in the opposite direction:  this shift 
to marketable  loans, though still small, represents  an increase in the liquidity of 
banks' balance sheets. Similarly, off-balance-sheet  activity not only helps banks 
evade restrictions,  but also generates  income without the hazard  of taking  positions. 
These developments  may be read as evidence that the liquidity cushion, systemati- 540  Victoria  Chick 
cally reduced over the years by learning, innovating, co-opting the regulator, and 
taking increasing  risks, had become too thin for comfort. 
Banks,  Securities  Markets,  and  Investment:  Conclusion 
The Keynes story, that investment causes saving, depends for its validity on 
some fraction of any new, higher level of investment  being financed  by the banks, 
because of their ability to finance in excess of saving. There are problems for this 
theory inherent  in new banking  practice  and with the evolution of the financing  hab- 
its of  firms. The amount of  investment financed by banks was probably always 
small, but it is probably shrinking. The conclusion, however, is not to return to 
loanable funds theory, but to  discover what the banks are financing: consumer 
loans, property  deals, takeovers, and other speculative  financial  transactions.  These 
are the new autonomous expenditures, the elements that shift the economy, and 
these factors are not only capricious, they do nothing  to improve  the capacity  to pro- 
duce and to compete. The system described in The General Theory, with all its 
threatening  emphasis  on uncertainty  and instability,  is a picnic by comparison. 
Notes 
1.  Moore [1991] denies this possibility, arguing that money is never in excess supply, be- 
cause it will quickly find its way to those with overdrafts  who will repay them. This was 
also the argument  of Kaldor and Trevithick  [19811. This is certainly  one disposition  of ex- 
cess money, but there are others, viz.  spending  it on goods or on securities. (TMe  last of 
these constitutes  funding if and only if firms are simultaneously  issuing the appropriate  se- 
curities, otherwise the price of existing securities will be bid up without any new money 
going to firms.) 
The argument  of Moore, Kaldor, and Trevithick  is merely extreme, precluding  other le- 
gitimate possibilities.  Moore  wrongly  attributes to  me  an  equally extreme position, 
namely, that extinction of overdrafts  is never possible. See Goodhart  [1989] and Howells 
[1997] for most welcome refutations. 
2.  I reserve  judgment on Keynes's stylized fact pending research  on this matter  for the inter- 
war period. 
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